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PUBLIC SPACE LAUNCH ACQUISITION: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Capt Lee W. Rosen, USAF Upper Stages Pgm Office, LA AFB, CA
Capt Ken Leeson, Defense Plant Repr. Office (GE), Evendale, OH
The opinions and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors
and are not intended to represent the official position of the DoD,
USAF, or any other government agency.
ABSTRACT

This study analyzes three commonly practiced approaches to
Government acquisition of space launch services. These approaches
are employed by the U.S. Air Force, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization. Launch contracts which were representative of each
organization's acquisition procedures were investigated and
evaluated along several critical issues and elements of the space
These issues included payload
launch acquisition process.
characteristics, government oversight, contractor incentives,
insurance, liability and cost. The critical issues and elements
were determined by using the Delphi method to survey 25 experts in
the space launch field. Archival contractual data from the three
government agencies were obtained and analyzed. The study found
many inconsistencies among the different agencies' acquisition
The paper ends with a recommendation for a hybrid
procedures.
acquisition approach encompassing the strengths of the three cases.
The approach entails the use of positive and negative Contractor
incentives, Government self-insurance, and streamlined commerciallike acquisition procedures.
RESEARCH FOCUS

The researchers conducted a case study that attempted to identify
the differences among three commonly implemented approaches to
government space launch. These three mechanisms included: 1) the
Air Force approach to launch, which utilizes limited commercial
procedures and significant government oversight; 2) the NASA launch
integrated government
approach with contractually
service
oversight; and 3) the establishment of a launch service contract
that was purported to involve exclusive contractor supervision and
liability. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
has contracted for launch services in this manner.
The Delta II launch vehicle was selected as a common reference of
comparison for the case study. Documentation from the following
Delta II launch contracts was obtained and analyzed in order to
provide a comparison of acquisition processes: 1) Air Force Delta II Follow-on, #91C0031, 2) NASA - MELV (Medium Expendable
Launch Vehicle) Contract, 3) SDIO - Launch of the LACE/RME mission
on a Delta II vehicle.
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DELPHI

Before the case study could be initiated, the researchers had to
identify the areas (issues and elements) of the launch process that
space launch experts believed to be critical for analysis. These
areas were then examined in all three of the cases chosen for the
study.
In order to validate and determine the final list of
critical issues and elements on which the three launch processes
were compared, the researchers chose to employ the Delphi method.
This technique is popular for gathering the judgements of experts
on a particular subject (Ref. 6).
The experts who participated in this study were identified by the
Researchers through a literature search, and through personal
interview. The recruiting of participants was accomplished through
the use of an introductory letter.
The researchers then developed an open ended questionnaire that
asked the respondents to identify and define what they considered
to be critical issues and elements of the space launch acquisition
process.
Once the first set of responses were received, the
results were summarized and reported back to the experts in the
form of a second survey. This follow-up survey asked respondents
to choose, on a five point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1)
to Strongly Agree (5), if a particular critical issue/element
should be included in the study. From these two iterations of the
delphi survey, the researchers reached a consensus of the critical
areas of the space launch acquisition process.
CASE STUDY

A case study methodology was selected as the mechanism for
comparing the three space launch approaches.
This mechanism
allowed for an in-depth study of the complexities and varieties of
space launch service contracting.
The researchers established contacts at each of the three
government agencies to act as the focal points for data collection.
Archival data in the form of contract documentation and interoffice
memoranda were collected for each launch in the study.
Once
collected, this written documentation was then segregated by issue
or element and reviewed for completeness.
If an area was not
adequately described by the archival data, deficiencies were noted
and questions that addressed the needed information were generated.
Any questions that could not be answered in detail by the point of
contact were noted. This point of contact was further queried for
the names of experts that could finalize the unanswered questions.
These persons were contacted in order to complete the collection of
data.
DELPHI FINDINGS.

'

•

lit the open-ended survey, many of the r'espondents used
bullet/outline format to list their responses, while other
individuals used essay format to convey their thoughts.
The
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or
researchers organized the results based on certain key words
concepts that were repeated by the respondents. When one of these
key words or concepts appeared on the answer form, the researchers
researchers
noted it, and kept a running tab on each category. The
organized the information into 13 separate categories which
comprised the second iteration of the delphi survey. Respondents
relative
were asked to score each category and sub-category on itsmentioned.
criticality using the five point Likert scale previously
additional
for
space
given
were
respondents
category,
each
After
comments.
The means and modes for every item on the second survey averaged
This finding
well over the Neutral (Likert scale 3) category.
of the
suggests that a consensus of the experts felt that most
items were, to some degree critical. The following list summarizes
was
and
survey,
delphi
the
the
iterations
both
of
the final results
used as the outline by which comparisons were made across the three
cases:
1 - Typical Payload Char.
2 - Oversight to Include:
Contractor Required Tasks
Contract Data Requirements
Listing (CDRLs)
Military Specification
Insight vs. Approval
Launch Authority
3 - Contractor Incentives
4 - Liability/Insurance
Third Party
Government Property
Launch Vehicle
5 - Cost of Launch Service
6 - Reliability
cs Many
Findings of the Case Study. Typical Payload Characteristi
Government officials have indicated the need for more oversight
involving missions with high complexity, costly payloads, isand
to
national security implications. The intent of the comparison This
determine the relative expendability of the payload. issues.
considers mission complexity, cost, and national security
The Air Force Delta Launch Contract is primarily concerned with
launching one satellite, the Navstar/GPS. The GPS will eventually
include 21 of these $65 million satellites. The standardization
that is a result of repeated missions has contributed to decreased
mission complexity.
Virtually every payload, thus nearly every launch, under thedoNASA
not
MELV Contract is unique. Although these scientific payloads onenecessarily have national security implications, most of these
of
many
Like
million).
$200
(over
expensive
are
payloads
of-a-kind
highly
the NASA missions, the SDIQ LACE/RME was a one-shot, for
the
complex, expensive mission (approximately $300' billion
Unlike NASA, LACE/RME was directly linked with
satellites).
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national security concerns. For these reasons, LACE/RME would be
considered the least expendable payload of the three cases studied.
It follows that critical missions like LACE/RME should command more
As the following
oversight throughout the procurement process.
analysis indicates, the researchers have perceived this to be the
opposite,
Of the three cases studied, the Air Force Delta II
Oversight.
Follow-On Contract appeared to support the most government
involvement and oversight. Contractor required tasks were listed
in greater number and detail than in both the NASA and SDIO launch
contracts. The Air Force contract mandated almost every aspect of
the launch process.
The NASA MELV contract focused on two critical Contractor
requirements, both of which required Government approval and
inclusion into the contract as compliance documents. The Mission
Specification Document serves as a type of Contractor-prepared
statement of work for the payload interface, environmental and
vehicle system requirements. The other significant NASA document
is the Performance Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP). It is a
Contractor-developed/Government approved document that deals with
oversight functions such as safety, configuration management and
Through these documents, NASA is able to ensure a
reliability.
significant level of oversight throughout the launch process.
The comparison of CDRLs among the three contracts produced similar
results. The Air Force, once again, posted the highest number of
Contractor required submittals. All of these mandatory documents
required acceptance via a DD Form 250, and many required Government
approval. This burden is somewhat eased by the fact that many of
the 83 CDRLs are only required when the Contractor is launching a
unique payload.
Although, the NASA CDRLs were not available, the existence of 50
such submittal requirements approximates the Air Force contract
documentation work load. This is especially true if one considers
that nearly every NASA mission is unique and that many of the
submittals will have to be altered significantly or reaccomplished
for each launch.
The SDIO LACE/RME launch contract made use of only 12 CDRLs. None
of these submittals required DD Form 250 acceptance or approval.
In general, the intent of the CDRLs was to foster communication
between the Contractor and the Government, and not dictate
requirements.
Before comparisons are drawn concerning reliance on military
specifications and standards, it is important to note that all
Delta II vehicles are manufactured under the same quality
processes, and to identical specifications (Ref. 7). Many of these
standards have been implemented by Air Force contracts throughout
the history of the system. In essence, the Air Force has provided
the direction for the vehicle production. This is probably due to

the fact that the Air Force helped to develop the Delta vehicle,
and has continued to be the largest customer for the Delta market.
These realities are reflected in the disparity among contracts as
to the number of compliance standards listed by each contract (Air
The Air Force total is largely
Force-30, NASA-6, SDIO-1).
It was not possible to
comprised of production standards.
determine which standards are currently contributing to the overall
success of the Delta system.
The Government holds final launch authority in all three cases,
whereas, in a commercial launch, the service provider would make
final decisions as to launch go/no-go. This is most likely due to
the Government's insistence on self-insuring the payloads, and its
It would be impractical to
ownership of all launch facilities.
give the Contractor the final say when it holds virtually no
liability for the success of the mission. This is in contrast with
a commercial launch, where the service provider is typically liable
for the payload and launch facilities.
Throughout the analysis, it was readily apparent that the Air Force
launch contract interjects Government involvement and oversight
into the launch process to a greater degree than the NASA and SDIO
contracts. The effect of the Air Force practices is to move away
from the procurement of launch services in the pure sense
(placement of a payload into a specified orbit for firm price).
The SDIO contract, on the other hand has implemented a bona-fide
From an
performance specification for the LACE/RME launch.
oversight perspective, SDIO has utilized commercial space launch
as the
such
documents
on
insistence
NASA's
procurement techniques.
PAIP have placed it in a position somewhere between the Air Force
and SDIO on the oversight spectrum.
The most interesting aspect of the comparison in government
oversight materializes when the mission and payload characteristics
The Air Force contract deals with the most
are considered.
expendable payloads and the most standardized launch process of the
three cases studied. However, it is the most oversight intensive
document. Conversely, the oversight-scarce SDIO launch involved
the least expendable payload and a fairly sophisticated launch
process.
Contractor Incentives. One would expect that a contract with less
oversight would require a greater degree of contractor incentives
to ensure performance and vice versa. This expected correlation
was exactly reversed for this case study. The Air Force contract
contained the strongest form of Contractor incentive of the three
cases. This was the requirement to re-fly any mission that failed
as a result of Contractor error, at no cost to the Government.
This translates into the potential for a contractor loss of
approximately $40 million.
NASA also made use of a negative incentive, however, it was less
sever than the Air Forces's. The NASA contract could penalize the
contractor up to $5,330,000 for a mission failure, but could not
request a reflight.
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In the Air Force and NASA launch agreements, the Contractor could
also earn additional sums of money for successful or exceptional
performance. The Air Force award fee criteria focused primarily on
the processes that the Contractor implements throughout many phases
of the contract. If, over time, the Contractor does an exceptional
job of complying with the standards that the Air Force has mandated
in the contract, the Contractor stands to receive the full $3
million award fee.
NASA's positive incentives differ substantially from the Air
A $1 million bonus is paid for each consecutive full
Force's.
The award fee is only tied to the final
mission success.
performance of a launch. NASA appears to be m6re concerned with
the outcome of the launch and less concerned with the execution of
This is a step in the direction of
certain launch processes.
commercial launch practices.
The SDIO LACE/RME procurement did not employ any special
The Contractor was guaranteed the full
contractual incentives.
In fact, the
contract price regardless of the mission outcome.
Contractor was immediately paid $4.5 million at contract award.
The reasoning for these payment procedures are not listed in the
contract. Interestingly, the Advanced Payment Clause which would
normally be required in this circumstance, was also missing. The
ramifications of the lack of incentives in the SDIO contract are
discussed in further detail in the following section on liability.
Liability/Insurance. With respect to third party liability, all
In each contract, the
three cases have chosen similar paths*
Government relies on the Contractor's current insurance policy to
form a base level of coverage, then the Government indemnifies the
contractor for any liability over the amount of this coverage. In
each circumstance, the Government would have been required to
reimburse the Contractor for any additional insurance coverage ovqr
the amounts that the Commercial Space Launch Act requires the
Contractor to carry. The Government has obviously decided that the
risk is not great enough to justify extra expense.
A similar indemnification process occurs with regard to Government
property (the most notable of which is the payload). In all three
cases the Government has self-insured the payload and launch
facilities. The alternative to this is to pay a higher price per
launch to handle the additional insurance requirements that would
In the Air Force and NASA
be forced upon a liable contractor.
launch scenarios, the Contractor still has a significant incentive
to carry out the mission to a successful conclusion, even though it
The previously mentioned
has no liability for a lost payload.
contractual incentives insure this.
The SDIO LACE/RME contract does not, however, use mission success
as a factor when determining how much to pay or penalize the
The Contractor receives the full contract price no
Contractor.
Because, the
matter what happens to the payload or facilities.
LACE/RME launch contract also released the Contractor of liability
for the payload, there is a question as to what incentives are left
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to steer the Contractor towards a successful conclusion to the
mission. This dilemma is accentuated by the fact that the SDIO
launch contained relatively little Government involvement.
A court injunction levied against the
Cost of Launch Services.
release of the NASA contract and threatened against the Air Force
limited the researchers' comparison of the three agencies' cost
The researchers were able to obtain the SDIO cost data,
data.
whicih places the cost for services at $35 million and range support
at $3 million.
The researchers originally hoped to try to develop a relationship
between the cost of launch services, and the amount of Government
oversight in the contract. Without detailed cost breakdowns, the
researchers were unable to accomplish this task.
Reliability- The Delta II launch Vehicle is an extremely reliable
ELV, especially in recent history. The relatively small population
of Delta II launches and the fact that virtually every launch has
been a success, make it difficult to draw a correlation between
However, the level of
reliability and procurement method.
oversight and use of military standards throughout the production
of the vehicles, may be a driving force behind the system's
success. One of the most significant factors that may affect the
System's reliability is that the Delta has had the opportunity to
mature of a span of three decades.
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The Air Force, NASA and SDIO Delta II launch acquisition process
may not be individually classified as "good" or "bad," "efficient 11
or "inefficient," "commercial" or "non-commercial." Each of the
agencies' processes has aspects that may be desirable if developing
"an ideal" Government launch procurement process.
By employing the streamlined procurement methods
Oversight.
prevalent in the SDIO contract, such as decreased Contractor
surveillance, fewer paperwork requirements, and the use of a
performance oriented specification, the Government would be able to
It
ease the Government and Contractor administrative burdens.
would essentially acknowledge that the Contractor is indeed the
true expert. This would allow the Contractor the flexibility to
This increased
innovate, and thus become more efficient.
efficiency could be transferred to the commercial sector, and
foster the development of the industry.
Ref light and Award Fees. There are many ways for the Government to
inspire successful performance. Reflight provisions and award fees
serve as a potent stimuli for Contractor behavior. The Air Force
Delta II ref light requirements are a desirable incentive because it
could potentially affect the Contractor's profitability. NASA's
performance based award fee is also an indispensable incentive that
could work in conjunction with a reflight provision. Performance
is the bottom line. These positive and negative incentives ensure
it, while helping build improved, and more trusting relationships
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with contractors.
effectiveness.

This can only lead to more efficiency and

Payload insurance can
Government Self-Insurance for Payloads.
place a significant monetary burden on the Contractor, which is
ultimately passed on in the form of higher fees to the Government.
Self-insurance is an acceptable risk for the Government if
reliability remains consistently high. However, Government selfinsurance must be used in conjunction with Contractor incentives in
order to manifest the Contractor's stake in the successful
performance of the mission.
The Role of the Air Force. The Air Force is by far, the largest,
most influential customer in the domestic space launch market. The
Air Force effectively drives the Commercial Space Launch Industry.
Therefore, the Air Force must also play the lead role in developing
more efficient, effective, and responsible space launch acquisition
processes.
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